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A veil of unprecedented uncertainty has descended over global financial
markets. Amidst the resulting pandemonium, it has nevertheless become
possible to divine a few precious truths from the current global financial
crisis. Paramount amongst these is perhaps that financial regulators from
Washington D.C. to London failed to recognise the gathering storm: that
they did (and do) not possess the requisite mandates, information or
expertise to effectively monitor - or indeed fully appreciate - the nature or

extent of potential systemic risks.' In ostensible acknowledgement of this
regulatory myopia, governments, financial regulators and commentators have
in recent weeks, and in almost perfect harmony, advocated a more 'macroprudential' approach toward financial regulation to be executed under the
watchful eyes of 'systemic risk regulators'. 2
Distilled to its essence, macro-prudential regulation involves the gathering
and analysis of macro-economic data respecting, inter alia, asset price
inflation, credit expansion, leverage ratios, funding mismatches and the
interconnectedness of financial institutions and markets with a view to
detecting, and ultimately deterring, socially sub-optimal levels and
concentrations of risk within the financial system.
Stated somewhat
differently, the primary objective of macro-prudential regulation is to identify
and preemptively deflate potential asset bubbles before their bursting can
threaten the stable and fluid operation of financial markets. In furtherance
of this objective, macro-prudential regulation contemplates enhancing
existing surveillance systems and disclosure obligations (especially in respect
of financial institutions deemed systemically important), expanding the
perimeter of financial regulation (to encompass institutions such as hedge
funds and instruments such as 'over-the-counter' derivatives), harmonising
national prudential regulation regimes and building more robust crossfunctional and cross-border information sharing and co-ordination
mechanisms.3 However, while representing an intuitively appealing response
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Principles of Financial Regulation (2009), Geneva Reports on the World Economy 11,
International Center for Monetary and Bank Studies (JCMBS), pp. vii and 6; The HighLevel Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, Report of the Bzgh-Level Group on Financial
Supervision in the EU (2009), p. 11.
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Institutions and Markets and For Liquidity Management (2009), Monetary and Capital Markets
Department; The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU (2009), supra note
1, pp. 59, 63.
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to an almost universally acknowledged deficiency in the pre-credit crunch
global regulatory environment, there exist a number of compelling reasons to
question whether macro-prudential regulation is capable of achieving its
laudable, and lofty, objectives.
I. Financial Markets are Very, Very Complex
It is almost impossible to overstate. The frequency and complexity of
interactions within and between financial markets and the real economies
they support - to say nothing of the nature and pace of change within these
markets - make the timely and comprehensive evaluation of potential
systemic risks an unrealistic prospect. Accordingly, it is all but inevitable that
systemic risk regulators will be called upon to design and implement macroprudential regulatory mechanisms armed with imperfect information.
Precisely how imperfect this information can be was amply illustrated by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its April 2006 Global Financial
Stability Report:
"[T]he dispersion of credit risk by banks to a broader and more diverse set
of investors, rather than warehousing such risk on their balance sheets,
has helped make the banking and overall financial system more resilient." 4

Indeed, none of the financial regulators presently vying with the newly
created Financial Stability Board for the crown as lead global systemic risk
regulator - including the IMF and U.S. Federal Reserve Board - correctly

forecast either the onset or pernicious effects of the current crisis. Blame for
this failure has, not entirely inappropriately, been variously located in the
absence of formal systemic mandates, fragmented regulatory structures, legal
constraints on information sharing and a general failure to demand and
receive timely and relevant information.5 Yet the complexity of financial
markets gives us reason to question whether these regulators, in the absence
of such impediments, would have possessed either the capacity or expertise
to evaluate all relevant information, generate clear and accurate forecasts and
deliver timely and effective regulatory action. Many of the factors which
contributed to the formation of the asset bubble which triggered the current
crisis - including historically low interest rates, the rapid expansion of credit,
ballooning trade imbalances and the growth and importance of the so-called

'shadow' banking sector6 - were readily observable. What was missing was
not data, but a comprehensive understanding of the complex interactions
within and between global financial markets.

International Monetary Fund, GlobalFinancialStability Report (April 2006), p. 51.
5 The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU (2009), supra note 1, p. 11;
IMF (2009), supra note 3, p. 3.
6 The term 'shadow' banking sector is used to describe entities such as hedge funds and
instruments such as over-the-counter derivatives which often, and to varying degrees,
reside outside the scope of financial services regulation.
4
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Proponents of macro-prudential regulation level two species of argument in
response. First, they observe the existence of a discernable pattern - an
'internal, self-amplifying dynamic that has lain at the root of both the recent,
and virtually all prior, financial crises' - which will assist systemic risk
regulators in identifying the formation of future asset bubbles. Second, they
assert that neither the complexity of financial markets nor our incomplete
understanding of them represent sufficient justification for failing to
intervene in order to avoid potential systemic crises.' The persuasiveness of
the first argument is undermined by both logic and experience: while it may
be possible to discern a pattern ex post, this must be distinguished from the ex
ante identification of its recurrence - an undertaking at which we have
repeatedly and demonstrably revealed ourselves to be generally inept. The
persuasiveness of the second argument is undermined by its wholesale
disregard for the social welfare consequences - in terms of lower productive
output, growth and employment - of regulatory action designed to deflate
potential asset bubbles. Indeed, while beyond the present scope, the social
welfare calculus associated with this growth/stability tradeoff introduces an
additional layer of complexity with which systemic risk regulators must
inevitably grapple.
II. Our Quantitative Models for Understanding Financial Markets are
Not Sufficiently Robust
In the heady days leading up to the current global financial crisis, the
prevailing intuition was that the complexity of modern financial markets had
been matched by the robustness of our quantitative models for measuring
and managing risk. We now know this not to be the case - the crisis having
spectacularly illustrated the philosophical and methodological shortcomings
of these models and, by implication, our own bounded rationality. More
specifically, the current crisis has exposed the frailty of many of the
fundamental assumptions imbedded within these models respecting, inter alia,
the efficiency of markets, the rationality of market participants, the
independence of variables and the normal distribution of events within
financial markets. The crisis has also exposed the impotence of these models
in terms of their ability to both account for network externalities and
exogenous shocks and correctly distinguish between the formation of
potential bubbles and shifts in the underlying price fundamentals of an asset.
Indeed, the time has come to acknowledge that the principles of 'Brownian
motion'" in physics upon which these quantitative models are based may be
of constrained utility in terms of understanding economic and social
interactions: that what we are dealing with in many contexts is not statistically
I ICMBS (2009), supra note 1, p. 5.
8 The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU (2009), supra note 1, p. 14.
9 Named after botanist Robert Brown, Brownian motion refers, inter alia, to the random
movement of particles in liquid. The same principle of randomness and, importantly, the
mathematical models used to describe it, reside at the heart of the efficient markets theory
(EMT) upon which the quantitative models employed in finance are typically premised.
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quantifiable risk, but true Knightian uncertainty.10 To the extent these
models and their progeny remain the primary quantitative basis for
measuring risk - and thus the fundamental value of assets - the effectiveness

of macro-prudential regulation will, accordingly, be similarly constrained.
III. Complexity Breeds Conflict, Not Consensus
The success of macro-prudential regulation is clearly predicated on the
existence of a high level of both positive and normative consensus within
systemic risk regulators respecting, inter alia, prevailing financial market
conditions, the socially optimal balance between economic growth and
financial stability and the appropriate course of regulatory action. Similarly,
within the context of an increasingly integrated global economy, the success
of macro-prudential regulation hinges on the existence of consensus,
harmonisation and co-ordination between systemic risk regulators. Yet given
the complexity of financial markets and our incomplete understanding of
them, it is not unreasonable to expect a significant measure of healthy
disagreement respecting these matters both within and between systemic risk
regulators. Compounding matters, to the extent that they find themselves in
different macro-economic environments, differentially exposed to the effects
of a potential systemic crisis, subject to different internal political pressures
or possessing other divergent incentives, it is reasonable to expect the
development of frictions between national governments respecting the
appropriate course of regulatory action and thorny issues such as burden
sharing. Finally, building the requisite consensus invariably takes time perhaps the most precious commodity in the face of a potential global
financial crisis. The necessity of consensus is thus likely to undermine both
the timeliness and effectiveness of macro-prudential regulation.
IV. Even Consensus Does Not Guarantee Timely and Effective
Regulatory Action
Assuming the requisite level of internal and cross-border consensus can be
forged, the success of macro-prudential regulation will still be contingent on
the potency of the regulatory mechanisms at the disposal of systemic risk
regulators. Beyond sounding the global risk alarm, these mechanisms will
likely continue to center around the recalibration of existing national
monetary policies and prudential banking requirements - albeit in a more
comprehensive, coordinated and nuanced fashion than has historically been
the case. However, to the extent that these mechanisms generate unintended
downstream consequences and require precious time to manifest their
desired effects, they represent less than perfect conduits for reshaping risk
"I A. Turner, The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis (March
2009), U.K. Financial Services Authority, p. 45. Named after economist Frank Knight,
Knightian uncertainty refers to risk which is not susceptible to quantifiable (i.e. statistical)
measurement;
F.H. Knight, Risk, Uncertaint and Profit (Houghton Mifflin Company,
Boston, 1921).
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preferences (and thus the allocation of resources and, ultimately, prices)
within financial markets. Collectively, these imperfections light the way
toward a potentially more effective arsenal of regulatory mechanisms based
not on the real-time evaluation of financial market conditions, but on actual
prudence. Examples of such mechanisms include the Spanish system of
'dynamic provisioning' (effectively mandating the accumulation of capital
buffers during economic upswings which can then be drawn against during
downswings) and Canadian rules imposing maximum leverage ratios on
financial institutions. While such mechanisms require periodic re-evaluation
with a view to, inter alia, striking the appropriate balance between economic
growth and financial stability, they are superior to macro-prudential
regulation to the extent that they necessitate neither significant cross-border
consensus nor the ability to accurately read financial market tea leaves.
Clearly, financial regulators failed to recognise the macro-economic signals
which warned of the impending global financial crisis and, in its wake, must
re-evaluate their approaches toward prudential regulation. Enhancing existing
surveillance systems and disclosure obligations, expanding the perimeter of
financial regulation, harmonising national prudential regulation regimes and
building more robust cross- functional and cross-border information sharing
and co-ordination mechanisms represent logical, and arguably necessary,
reforms. However, to the extent that financial regulators have identified
macro-prudential regulation as a panacea in respect of future systemic crises,
they have blinded themselves to what may ultimately be the most important
lesson to be drawn from the current crisis. Stated simply, we possess neither
the tools to fully understand the complexity of financial markets, nor the
macro-economic regulatory mechanisms to actively manage them. In these
respects, it is not that the current global financial crisis has precipitated
uncertainty within financial markets so much as it has revealed it.
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